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curring opinions adequately resolves the dilemma because: (1) it is not
always possible to determine which are borderline cases, and (2) it would
appear to be rather difficult to judicially notice the standards of a large
community like New York or Chicago. There was, however, a strong dis-
senting opinion which basically followed the California court's position,25
citing the opinions of Justice Frankfurter and Justice Harlan in Smith v.
California20 as authority. This dissent indicated a dissatisfaction with the
reasoning of the majority and a firm conviction that excluding the de-
fendant's evidence in obscenity cases does violate due process.
As was pointed out previously, certain members of the Supreme Court
of the United States and experts in the field of obscenity appear to be
leaning more and more toward the position that the admissibility of com-
parable writings and/or expert testimony as evidence of the community
standards is a constitutional guarantee. Indeed this position appears to be
the more sensible one. The fact is, there is such a plethora of ideas and
philosophies which compose present-day societies, that to extract a par-
ticular community standard from this mass is an extremely difficult task
for any judge or jury to perform without the help of any guide lines. In
light of the increasing strength gathering behind this position, and the
fact that the New York court has a strong dissent, it would appear as
though New York will ultimately have to change its position and admit
such evidence in obscenity cases. In the meantime, the Finkelstein case
represents the view opposed to the California position, and accounts for
the split of authority on this problem to date.
25 In re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 366 P. 2d 305 (1961).
26 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
PARENT AND CHILD-STATE'S RIGHT TO TAKE CUSTODY
OF A CHILD IN NEED OF MEDICAL CARE
John Perricone, a blue baby, was brought to the Bedford S. Pollack
Hospital by his parents. When the infant was admitted, Mrs. Perricone
consented to the performance of any surgical operations as the physicians
of the hospital thought necessary for the welfare of the boy. However,
she instructed that it be noted on the progress record "the parents are
Jehovah Witnesses-request no usage of blood transfusions." Blood trans-
fusions became necessary and they were refused by John's parents.
Thomas J. Finn, superintendent of the hospital, brought an action in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Hudson County, Jersey City,
New Jersey, to have a special guardian appointed for the purpose of ad-
ministering the necessary transfusions. A special guardian was appointed
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under New Jersey Statutes' providing for the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court to take custody of a child who is neglected or whose
parents are unfit. The Perricone's appealed from this order contending
that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court did not have jurisdiction
under the law because they were not unfit parents nor was the child neg-
lected. The issue is whether the parents' refusal to consent to the giving
of necessary blood transfusions to their infant son conferred jurisdiction
upon the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court to take custody of the
child and appoint a special guardian to administer such transfusions. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey in affirming the lower court's decision
stated that the provisions under the New Jersey Statutes2 conferring
custody of a neglected child to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
have as their prime purpose the welfare of infants. Such legislation has
provided that the jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court shall extend to protect infants lacking in necessary medical care
because of parental refusal of such care. In such instances the child shall
be deemed neglected under the law and its parents unfit. State v. Perricone,
37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
The jurisdiction exercised by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
was based on the principle of parens patriae, i.e. a sovereign right and
duty to care for a child and protect him from neglect during his minority.8
This principle regarding the state's interest in infants was specifically
written into the statute establishing the jurisdiction of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.
It is hereby declared to be a principle governing the law of this state that chil-
dren under the jurisdiction of said court are wards of the state . . . entitled
to the protection of the state, which may intervene to safeguard them from
neglect.. .. 4
The holding in the Perricone case follows the majority of jurisdictions
in the exercise of the sovereign right to take custody of a neglected child
under parens patriae. The importance and reach of such a holding can be
properly illustrated by showing how far other states have gone in taking
19 N.J.S.A. § 2-9, "Parents or custodian of child unfit; action in ... Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court. When the parents of any minor child are ... unfit... or
shall neglect to provide the child with proper protection .... as to endanger the wel-
fare of the child.... The court [Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court] may proceed
in the action in a summary manner or otherwise." and 9 N.J.S.A. §6-1, "Neglect of a
child shall consist in any of the following acts, by any one having the custody or con-
trol of the child: (a) willfully failing to provide ... medical attention or surgical treat-
ment,... for the child's physical or moral well being."
2 Ibid.
3Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 114 A. 2d 1 (1955); Lippincott v. Lippincott, 97 N.J.
Eq. 517, 128 Ad. 254 (1925).
4 2A N.J.S.A. S 4-2.
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custody of a neglected child in those situations where the child is in need
of medical care and the parents refuse to permit such care to be given.
There are two situations where the courts have taken custody of a child
to administer necessary medical care under the doctrine of parens patriae.
The first is where such medical care is required to preserve the life of the
child. The second exists when medical care is necessary for the general
health of the child.
The ensuing three cases illustrate the state's right to take custody of a
child in need of medical care where failure to provide such by the parents
will almost certainly result in the death of the child. In People ex rel.
Wallace v. Labrenz, an Illinois case, the parents of an infant, suffering
from a rare blood disease, refused its receiving necessary blood transfu-
sions to save its life. The court held the child neglected and appointed a
guardian to administer the necessary transfusions. The jurisdiction exer-
cised by the court was based on the government's responsibility under the
doctrine of parens patriae, to care for and protect infants from neglect.6
Relying on the Labrenz decision the Court of Appeals of New York7 held
that parents refusal to consent to a blood transfusion for their child, where
the child's life was in jeopardy, warranted finding that the child was
neglected within the terms of the Family Court Act of New York.8 The
act defines a neglected child as one who is not adequately supplied with
medical or surgical care by its parents. In Morrison v. State,9 an infant
child was affected with erythroblastic anemia and competent medical
opinion was that the child would die if it was not given a blood transfu-
sion. The court held that the paramount right of a parent to the custody
of his child need not be considered if the life of the child is at stake and
said: 10
[Elvery human being is endowed by God with the inalienable right to live.
The fact that the subject is the infant child of a parent who, arbitrarily, puts
his own theological belief higher than his duty to preserve the life of his child
cannot prevail .... 11
5 411 111.618, 104 N.E. 2d 769 (1952).
6 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, S§ 2001-15 (1961).
7 In the Matter of Santos, 16 App. Div. 2d 755, 227 N.Y.S. 2d 450 (1962).
s N.Y. COURT REORGANIZATION Ac'r S§ 311-313. This act is designed to provide due
process of law for determining whether a child is neglected, and the Family Court has
exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings involving a child alleged to be neglected
under the act.
9 252 S.W. 2d 97 (Kansas City Ct. of Appeals 1952).
10 Ibid. and 12A V.A.M.S. 211.010, the Juvenile Court shall have jurisdiction over a
child who is alleged to be neglected because its parents refuse to provide necessary
medical, surgical or hospital care for such child.
11 252 S.W. 2d 97, 101 (1952).
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Now what of those situations, where the child is not in need of emergen-
cy medical care to save its life, when the general health of the child is
concerned and the parental care given is insufficient? The succeeding cases
will examine the state's right in taking custody of a child in order to pro-
vide medical treatment for its general health. To order medical treatment
the court need not find it necessary to save the life of the child. It need
only be shown that the health, limb, person or future of the child be in
jeopardy.12 In In re Vasko,13 it was held that, where parents refused to
permit the removal of the eye of a two year old child as recommended by
medical experts, the court was authorized to order such operation. Simi-
larly in Mitchel v. Davis,'4 where a child was suffering from arthritis and
the mother refused medical treatment but relied solely upon the effects of
prayer, the child was considered neglected and proper medical care was
ordered.
In proceedings for determination of whether the minor child is without
proper care, paramount consideration is not limited to whether an emer-
gency exists in terms of the life or death of the child but also extends to
whether it is being provided proper medical and surgical care necessary
for its health.15 In the case of In re Seifert,'6 a father had arbitrarily re-
fused permission for an operation on his twelve year old son's harelip and
cleft palate, the New York Court of Appeals held that the act11 empower-
ing the Children's Court to make an order for surgical care of a neglected
child enables the court to order the operation notwithstanding the parents'
objection. So far as to give the court custody of a child where the natural
custodian had failed to provide the necessary medical or surgical care,
there need not be an emergency. The preserving of the general health and
welfare of the child is all that is required.1s
The rationale behind the state taking custody of a neglected child under
the doctrine of parens patriae, in those specific instances where the parents
refuse to provide necessary medical care, is based upon the state's police
power.19 Such police power is vested in a state to establish laws and ordi-
nances for the purpose of securing the peace, good order, morals and
121n re Kronjaeger, 166 Ohio 172, 140 N.E. 2d 773 (1957).
13 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933).
14 205 S.W. 2d 812 (Texas Ct. of Civil Appeals 1947).
15 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933).
16 285 App. Div. 221, 137 N.Y.S. 2d 35 (1955).
17 N.Y. CHILDREN'S COURT AcT §§ 2(4) (e), 6(1) (e, g), 24. A neglected child is one
whose parents "neglect or refuse . . . to provide necessary medical, surgical, institu-
tional or hospital care for such child."
18 In re Snyder, 328 Mich. 277, 43 N.W. 2d 849 (1950); In re Du Mond, 196 Misc. 16,
92 N.Y.S. 2d 805 (1949); Walsh v. Walsh, 146 Misc. 604, 263 N.Y.S. 517 (1933).
19 State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
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health of the .community.20 Under this power, the control over children
for the protection of their health by the state seems almost limitless.21 In
fact the police power of the state has been extended to cover a case in-
volving an unborn child. In Hoener v. Bertinato,'22 parents of an unborn
child refused to consent to a blood transfusion for the child to be given
immediately after birth. Medical opinion and history of past pregnancies
of the mother indicated that the transfusion would be essential to save the
infant's life. The court held that the parents were neglecting to provide
the child with proper protection, and ordered that the blood transfusions
be administered. This unborn child's right to life and health entitled it to
legal protection.
The purpose of the law allowing a state to take custody of a child,
where the child is in need of medical cafe and its parents refuse to permit
such care to be given, is to insure the health, welfare and well being of the
child. Any parental action which would jeopardize this objective con-
stitutes such a violation of duty as to forfeit the right of custody.
20 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Klein v. Klein, 8 App. Div. 2d 844, 190
N.Y.S. 2d 402 (1959).
21 Limitations have been set down in these cases relying on the Washington Supreme
Court Decisions in In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P. 2d 765 (1942). The court
held that it does not have authority to take custody and subject a minor child to surgical
operation over the objection of its parents. The mere fact that a court is convinced of
the necessity of subjecting a minor child to a surgical operation will not sustain a court
order which deprives the parent of the responsibility and the right to decide the ulti-
mate welfare of the child. These limitations, however, have been confined to instances
arising within the State of Washington. In re Frank, 41 Wash. 2d 294, 248 P.2d 553
(1952); In re Petrie, 40 Wash. 2d 809, 246 P. 2d 465 (1952); Wade v. State, 39 Wash.
2d 744, 238 P. 2d 914 (1951).
22 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
PATENT LAW-FUNCTION OF THE APPARATUS
REJECTION-INCONSISTENT WITH THE
PATENT ACT OF 1952
Appellant, Loren G. Symons, filed a patent application' claiming as his
invention both a method of and apparatus for grinding2 in a Rotating
and Gyrating Ball Mill. The method sought to be patented comprised
the operative steps performed by the apparatus in effecting the grinding
operation. The Patent Office Examiner reviewing the application, made a
I Serial No. 511,655 filed May 27, 1955, issued as Patent No. 3,042,322 on July 3, 1962.
2 Method or process, and apparatus, are separate classes of subject matter recognized
by statute as patentable. 35 U.S.C.A. S 101 (1953).
